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THE OPEN SOURCE MEDIA SUMMARY

July 27, 2023

ACADEMIA'S OPENNESS COULD STRENGTHEN ITS PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Peter Schiffer and Frederick R. Chang | *Issues in Science and Technology* | Summer 2023

Starting with Vannevar Bush's seminal 1945 report, *Science, the Endless Frontier*, the federal government has invested significantly in support of fundamental research at universities across all areas of science and engineering. For even longer, government agencies have partnered with universities to perform research in support of agency missions and to meet national needs. For example, the National Institutes of Health support health-related research, the Department of Agriculture supports agricultural research programs, and the Department of Energy supports energy solutions. And of course, since World War II, the Department of Defense has invested in defense-oriented research at universities. Strong government-university research partnerships can be especially impactful to one sector of the government that is somewhat invisible to outsiders: the US intelligence community (IC). The IC comprises 18 organizations and agencies within the executive branch of the federal government—all with the shared mission of supporting the government's understanding of the world by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Fulfilling this mission requires access to the most advanced science and technology (S&T) available.

Read the full article [here](#).

U.S. BANS STUDENTS FROM CHINA'S MILITARY-LINKED UNIVERSITIES. ITS ALLY JAPAN WELCOMES THEM.

Sylvan Lebrun | *The Wall Street Journal* | July 21, 2023

The U.S. has blocked students from China's military-linked universities but its ally Japan is giving them a green light, a divergence that some believe could open the door to academic espionage. Japan isn't bashful about its willingness to welcome Chinese students. Officials in government and academia say they are glad to have students who are seeking an alternative to the U.S. after Washington tightened curbs citing the importance of free intellectual and scientific exchanges. "From the perspective of Chinese students, America has passed them over, rejected them," said Hiroaki Aihara, executive vice president of the University of Tokyo. "By contrast, they're welcome in Japan." Others say Japan is ignoring security risks. Japan is a "paradise for the Chinese spies," said Kunihiro Miyake, a former Japanese diplomat who is a research director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Academics are "not sufficiently concerned about the possible infiltration of their cultural or educational exchange," he said.

Read the full article [here](#).



DOD TO SCREEN RESEARCHERS FOR RISKY FOREIGN TIES

Mitch Ambrose | American Institute of Physics | July 20, 2023

The Department of Defense published a policy last month that details the process it will use to assess whether applicants for DOD research grants have risky connections to foreign entities and to reject proposals presenting unacceptable risks. The policy is accompanied by a matrix of risk factors that will guide grantmaking decisions by DOD program officers. Some parts of DOD have already implemented this type of review procedure, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the new policy requires all DOD research arms to follow suit. The move responds to a 2021 presidential directive on research security known as NSPM-33 and requirements in recent legislation, such as the CHIPS and Science Act's ban on funding researchers who participate in "malign foreign talent recruitment programs." In parallel with the new policy, DOD released initial lists of such recruitment programs as well as of foreign research institutions it cautions against collaborating with, fulfilling a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.

Read the full article [here](#).

CONGRESS'S FIXATION WITH CHINA'S 'MALIGN INFLUENCE' UNDERMINES AMERICANS' CIVIL LIBERTIES AND SECURITY

Jessica J. Lee and Rachel Esplin Odell | Responsible Statecraft | July 26, 2023

At a conference of Chinese Americans last week, former Washington governor and former U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke decried the way that "geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, coupled with overreaching U.S. policies" have created a hostile environment for people of Chinese descent in America. To counter these trends, he highlighted the important principle, "We make America great by celebrating our diversity, not by fearing it or demonizing it." Unfortunately, the Strategic Competition Act recently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a related bill that may be marked up by the House Foreign Affairs Committee would do the opposite. Specifically, Sections 132, 133, and 136 of the SCA, which echo provisions in H.R. 2329 on "countering the Chinese Communist Party's malign influence," risk missing the bigger picture of influence operations emanating domestically and globally, as well as deepening paranoia and anger against Asian Americans by painting China's threat in broad strokes.

Read the full article [here](#).


HOW OPEN SHOULD AMERICAN SCIENCE BE?

Chris Fall, Bruce Guile, Norbert Holtkamp, Caroline S. Wagner, Denis Simon, Patrick Gallagher, Joseph Bankoff | Issues in Science and Technology | Summer 2023

In "The Precarious Balance Between Research Openness and Security" (*Issues*, Spring 2023), E. William Colglazier makes an important contribution to the ongoing dialog about science security, and particularly regarding the United States' basic science relationship with China. As a former director of the Department of Energy Office of Science, I agree with his assessment that rushing to engineer and implement even more restrictive top-down controls on basic science collaboration could be counterproductive, especially without a thoughtful analysis of the impact of the actions that already have been taken to thwart nefarious Chinese behavior. In our personal lives, we instinctively understand when a relationship is not mutually beneficial and when we are being taken advantage of even when the rules are vague. It is true that the government of China, previously operating from a position of weakness, has pursued a coordinated and comprehensive strategy to harvest US scientific and technological progress and talent through a variety of overt and obscured means.

Read the full article [here](#).

Academic Security and Counter Exploitation Program | *The Open Source Media Summary* | July 27, 2023 | Page 2 of 4



CYBERSECURITY: WE'RE DOING IT ALL WRONG

Gentry Lane | Forbes | July 24, 2023

Over the last 20 years, the cybersecurity market has steadily grown into a thriving global industrial complex. Thousands of companies, dozens of conferences and too many trade journals, blogs and so, why aren't we more secure? Both cybercrime and state-sponsored military cyber aggression are on an upward trajectory as the skill, sophistication and sheer number of bad actors continues to increase. Given private industry's technological overmatch, shouldn't the frequency and severity of cybersecurity events be trending downward instead of up? The problem is one of fundamental misalignment. Cybersecurity provider business models are predicated on protracted cyber malfeasance. If there's no aggression, if there's no crime, then there's no business. The cyber industrial complex doesn't profit from deterring or denying cyber hostilities. They profit from a continued state of emergencies and uncertainty. As long as shareholders are happy with sales, this dynamic won't change.

Read the full article [here](#).

GERMANY MOVES TO CREATE NEW RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH COOPERATION WITH CHINA

David Matthews | Science/Business | July 18, 2023

Germany's new China strategy has outlined plans to withhold federal support from research projects where there is a risk of "knowledge drain" to China, as well as promising to make German academics better aware of the security risks of cooperation. The strategy, released on 14 July, is the result of months of bickering between coalition partners in the government. The outcome is a compromise document that aims to "de-risk" links to China without fully decoupling, aligning Germany with the approach set out by the European Commission earlier this year. The plan contains potentially significant new policy on research and innovation and warns that scientific relations with Beijing have become unbalanced – again echoing Commission concerns. Arguably the most significant commitment is to "issue provisions so that [research] projects with China in which knowledge drain is likely are not supported or only supported when suitable conditions are imposed."

Read the full article [here](#).

SILICON TRIANGLE: THE UNITED STATES, TAIWAN, CHINA AND GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR SECURITY

Hoover Institution Press | July 18, 2023

The United States, Taiwan, and China are bound within a "silicon triangle." Semiconductors link our geopolitics, our ongoing economic prosperity, and our technological competitiveness. The more than two dozen participants in this working group have worked together for eighteen months to better understand this strategic triangle. The questions we considered include these: How can the United States mitigate the risks of semiconductor supply chain disruptions and become an even more competitive player in this foundational critical technology? How can this be done in a way that preserves Taiwan's self-governing democracy, underpins its prosperity and our partnership, and promotes stability in the Taiwan Strait? How can we work with global partners to respond to new vulnerabilities stemming from China's state-driven global semiconductor ambitions?

Read the full article [here](#).



MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT U.S. DEFENSE EXPORT CONTROLS

U.S. Department of State | July 10, 2023

Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), defense export controls are a key tool to safeguard technologies that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage to the United States. Our system of export controls was designed to protect U.S. national security and further its foreign policy goals, as well as meet legislative requirements such as congressional notification and reporting. Properly implemented export controls mitigate diversion and proliferation risks, which both bolsters U.S. national security and contributes to regional and international security and stability.

Read the full article [here](#).

DON'T BE A PAWN OF REPRESSIVE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

National Counterintelligence and Security Center | March 2023

Foreign intelligence entities (FIEs) and elements working on behalf of repressive regimes have sought to use U.S.-based persons to facilitate their efforts to threaten or harm perceived critics and opponents in the United States. For instance, FIEs from the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other nations have used U.S.-based persons to conduct surveillance against and collect personal information on individuals their regimes were targeting in the United States. Examples include: As recently as February 2022, an individual who was later charged as acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government worked with a private investigator and a local U.S. law enforcement officer as part of efforts to forcibly repatriate targeted individuals to China. In mid-2020, Iranian intelligence utilized the services of a private investigator as part of a foiled plot to kidnap a critic of Iran from the United States.

Read the full article [here](#).

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